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First Steps Towards Hearts and Minds?
USAID‟s Countering Violent Extremism Policies in Africa
26 June 2012
Daniel P. Aldrich1
Abstract: The United States government has adopted new approaches to counter violent
extremist organizations around the world. “Soft security” and development programs include
focused educational training for groups vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, norm messaging
through local radio programming, and job creation in rural communities. This article evaluates
the effectiveness of one set of these multi-vectored, community-level programs through analysis
of data from 200 respondents in two similar, neighboring cities in northern Mali, Africa. The
data show that residents in Timbuktu who were exposed to the programming for up to five years
displayed measurably altered civic behavior and listening patterns in comparison with their
counterparts in the control city of Dire which had no programming (controlling for potential
covariates including age, ethnicity, and political and socioeconomic conditions). However, there
was little measurable difference between the groups in terms of their cultural identities and
attitudes towards the West. This article suggests that the process of “winning hearts and minds”
can be effective at certain levels but may require extended time and dedicated resources to have
higher-level results.
Introduction
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, decision makers in the U.S.
government have stepped up their efforts to decrease the threats from violent extremist
organizations (VEOs) such as Abu Sayyaf, Al Qaeda and its regional allies and affiliates
(including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al Shabab),
Hamas, and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Much of the funding for countering violent extremism has gone
toward “kinetic” operations such as covert or battlefield operations, drone strikes, and the
training of US-allied military forces in host nations. Of the funds set aside for fighting the “war
on terror” between fiscal year (FY) 2001 and FY 2012, only five percent has gone towards
diplomacy and development programs of the State Department and United States Agency for
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International Development (USAID).1 Planners may rely on military responses because they
remain familiar and allow quickly measurable outcomes.
Nevertheless, many are beginning to recognize that they cannot, as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen publicly acknowledged, “kill our way to victory.”2 For
example, while drone strikes may reduce the risks to US military personnel on the ground and
remove VEO leaders from the battlefield, they simultaneously reinforce grievance narratives of
such organizations and the “collateral damage” angers local populations and host governments
alike.3 This was the case in Somalia in the mid-2000s and remains an issue in Yemen and
Pakistan.4
Recently, the U.S. government has taken on broader strategy based on a diplomacy,
development, and defense platform that seeks to incorporate a soft-side approach in the fight
against violent extremism.5 As one decision maker argued, “[t]he way to undermine violent
extremism is to give potential recruits…a viable alternative for which to live, not die.”6
Strategies from the softer side include addressing alienation among marginalized groups,
improving civil-military relations, and improving educational and vocational opportunities.7
Observers may recognize this countering violent extremism (CVE) approach as an offshoot of
the “soft power” approach advocated by the former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joe Nye
which promoted co-optation rather than coercion as a lever for changing behaviors.8
Where hard power relies on military strength and deterrence, soft power rests on
credibility, trust, and shared norms. Recognizing the multiple factors which can radicalize
individuals and either push or pull them to join violent extremist organizations,9 the soft
approach to counter-terrorism seeks to decrease the likelihood of recruitment and dry up the
labor pool for potential terrorists.10 It does so through, among other methods, job provision,
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vocational training, and information diffusion techniques. Employment growth may embed local
residents into local networks and institutions and inoculate them against incentives from
insurgent groups. Stronger civic engagement ties locals into legitimate local governments and
encourages them to support efforts to keep out violent extremist groups. Similarly, radio
programs on peace and tolerance can reduce intergroup tension and make violence less likely.
USAID and the State Department began these new strategies in the early 2000s with a special
focus on developing African nations with wide, ungoverned spaces and a large Muslim
population.11
U.S. planners show special interest in Africa because of its burgeoning youth population,
persistent lack of educational, housing and vocational opportunities, long-simmering grievances
among marginalized populations, and location on heavily-trafficked routes.12 Chad, Niger,
Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, Nigeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria serve as the main locations
for the ongoing “battle of ideas”13 between VEO recruiters on one side local moderates, national
governments, and United States partners on the other.14 Chief among the programs of the State
Department and USAID has been the Pan Sahel Initiative (created in 2002) which became the
Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP, created in 2005); the Peace through
Development (PDEV, started in 2008 and now operating as PDEV II) program has emerged
from TSCTP. Alongside these programs USAID has run a number of smaller-scale programs for
countering violent extremism.
In cooperation with host nation governments, local partners, and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), USAID and the State Department have sought to improve governance,
develop community resilience, and reduce the impact of VEO narratives on populations across
Africa. TSTCP – the largest of the programs focused on the often ungoverned spaces of northern
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Africa – targets “youth empowerment, education, media, and good governance.”15 Mechanisms
under TSCTP include micro-grants for schools and teacher training, funds for strengthening the
capacity of local NGOs, youth development initiatives, and technical and content assistance for
increasing information flow on issues of peace and tolerance. Funding for these programs
remains small in comparison with investments in military solutions; the USAID budget for
TSCTP in fiscal year 2005 was roughly $5 million, increasing to $9 million by FY 2009, with
$16 million projected in the FY 2012 request.16 Despite the prominence of the soft side
approach in the new U.S. strategy – as evidenced through the U.S. military‟s new Concept Plan
7500 (CONPLAN 7500) which explicitly pushes development and diplomacy upstream and
military force downstream17 – little is known about its actual effects on targeted populations.
One recent overview of multiple studies found mixed-effects from development-based CVE
strategies in the field in Iraq and Afghanistan based primarily on job creation and economic
approaches.18
This article seeks to measure the outcome of intensive US government activities in West
Africa through a quasi-experimental paired-comparison study of 200 respondents from two
similar towns in the nation of Mali. While a military coup headed by Captain Amadou Sanogo
overthrew Mali‟s elected president Amadou Toumani Toure in late March 2012 (and pro-junta
protestors attacked interim leader Dioncounda Traore in late May 2012), the country had been a
stable if weak and developing democracy since the early 1990s. Mali, with more than 15 million
people, remains among the poorer nations of the world19 and one in which a Tuareg separatist
movement in the north has worried many observers who fear a potential alliance with al Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).20 As a result of recent battles between the National Movement for
the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA, which formed in 2011) rebel group in northern Mali and
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government forces, more than 320,000 people have fled their homes. USAID has been carrying
out a number of programs since 2005 in Mali focused on strengthening the resilience of local
communities to the messages and inducements offered by violent extremist groups in the region
such as AQIM.
Landlocked Mali presents a critical case study21 for illuminating the impact of CVE
programming given its poverty, illiteracy, ungoverned spaces where the state has little capacity,
and long-term internal conflicts. Tuareg-led groups have sought independence for the north and
has fought on and off against the central Malian government since 1960 (the end of French
colonial rule). Mali‟s colonial legacy and series of coups have created weakened political
institutions and it has suffered from food insecurity.22 Further, the countering violent extremism
programming in Mali has been experimental and less developed than in other nearby Sahel
countries.23 Should the data from this study show that U.S. programs altered behaviors and
attitudes under such difficult conditions, it would indicate a fortiori that these tactics would have
an impact in more hospitable and stable locales.
This article makes several contributions to the literature. First, “measuring and
evaluating counter-terrorism policies” remains an understudied topic24 and “[t]he majority of the
literature in the field comprises commentary and critique and lacks an empirical research
basis.”25 One estimate based on the review of more than 100 articles found that less than 10
percent used quantitative analysis to illuminate the outcomes of radicalization and deradicalization programs.26 Recognizing these broader gaps in the research field, this article seeks
to provide a quantitative analysis of US government programming in Africa using new data from
the field along with multiple analytical techniques. The conclusions drawn by this paper are
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based on a paired-comparison type quantitative field study undertaken in December 2010 using
multiple approaches to analyze the data.
Next, while many in the West are concerned about internet use by VEO recruiters, most
of the population in the Sahel lacks access to the internet, and instead receives ideas via radio.
Perhaps six percent of Africa‟s population has regular access to the internet, and studies have
shown that more than 85 percent of Malians have never used it.27 Similarly, due to a lack of
infrastructure, very few residents in Mali have regular access to electricity and thus television
programming. Although cell phone use is rising, phones themselves serve as conduits for radio
programming, as even the base-model cell phones offered in Mali have FM radio receivers.28
This study partially focuses on whether or not populations in Mali access existing CVE messages
available to them through a more available medium: local radio stations.
Finally, this study underscores that there is no “silver bullet” in reducing violent
extremism. Given the large number of tools available in the fields of public diplomacy,
democracy promotion, and development, studies have yet to identify a single tactic which can
work in all countries and cultures. Instead, as this study emphasizes, strategies must be tailored
to specific local communities based on cultural, linguistic, historical, and contextual factors29 and
may have only partial effects on the target audience.
This article first lays out the theories explaining what factors might drive behavioral and
attitudinal changes, then explains the data used in the study and the methodologies used to
analyze the data. Beginning with bivariate, Chi-squared tested analyses, the paper moves on to
multivariate regression techniques and propensity score matching to better support causal claims
about the connections between variables of interest. It discusses the results, sets out the next
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steps in the research agenda, and concludes with broader lessons about countering violent
extremism programming.

Theory
This study sought to understand if several years of U.S. government-funded programs
altered cognition and behaviors of Malians through a quasi-experiment involving 200
respondents in the paired cities of Timbuktu and Dire. Past experiments have used similar
paired-village frameworks in which similar communities are studied to better understand the
impact of policy interventions such as radio programming; in such field tests, one village or city
receives the treatment (in this case, U.S. programs) while the other does not.30 The Trans-Sahara
Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in Mali sought to increase civic participation, reduce
inter-group tension and violence, and strengthen the resilience of vulnerable groups – such as
young men – to recruitment by violent extremist organizations. Strategic communication, such
as messages broadcast through radio programming, can “help foster positive social networks,
provide opportunities for individuals to gain respect and recognition, [and] increase the
circulation of moderate voices and perspectives.”31 It focused its programming on Timbuktu and
bypassed Dire.
The core outcomes (dependent variables) of interest here are accessing peace and
tolerance programs on local radio channels, participation in community-level decision making,
perspectives on Al Qaeda‟s use of violence in the name of Islam, and beliefs in whether or not
the U.S. is fighting Islam (or terrorism). Policy planners hope that programs countering violent
extremism will increase access to tolerance radio programming and civic participation, lead more
residents to be critical of Al Qaeda‟s use of violence, and motivate people to see the United
States as combatting terror, not Islam. Successful outcomes would theoretically make young
7

Malian men less vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist organizations and more likely to
remain embedded in positive, mainstream social and religious institutions. Hence should the
TSCTP-based programs in Timbuktu prove effective, residents there should demonstrate these
behaviors more than their counterparts in Dire (who are not receiving such messages or
benefiting from extensive U.S. government programs). Research has shown that, beyond actual
exposure to norm messaging and programming, a number of factors influence behaviors and
attitudes: demographic factors, socioeconomic drivers, and intrinsic cultural attitudes.
The study controls for demographic factors such as age, sex, and ethnicity. Scholars have
long argued that sex strongly determines behavioral and cognitive outcomes, with some arguing
that women and men display differences due to intrinsic biological factors and others arguing for
the role of education and socialization.32 Whatever the reasons, analyses in Mali have shown
broad differences between women and men in the areas of education, health care, governance,
and economic growth,33 and thus controlling for sex is critical. Another critical factor to take
into account is age, as many attitudes develop through exposure, life experience, and education.34
A third demographic variable of interest is ethnicity – in this project whether or not the
respondents in this area of northern Mali were Sonrai (also spelled Songhay, who traditionally
were farmers) or Tuareg (who worked as herders). Ethnicity can strongly condition expectations
about state and local population assistance based on levels of support or marginalization. Mali‟s
long-simmering Tuareg rebellion has been fueled by the belief among many Tuareg that the
government has failed to follow through on past promises and deliver needed services to their
communities. Indeed, USAID researchers noted more than a decade ago that “[d]ue to the harsh
climate, the lack of natural resources, high transport costs, a high illiteracy rate, and the nomadic
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lifestyle of many of its inhabitants, the North, and particularly the Tuareg population, has not
received an equitable portion of governmental resources.”35
Socioeconomic and political conditions also impact norms and behaviors. The survey
included questions about belief in political freedom, satisfaction with services in the community,
contact with local political representatives, the imagined likelihood of a local council member
listening to concerns, and the degree of efficacy that the respondent reported. These variables
capture the perspectives of the respondents about their financial conditions and the political
environments in which they live. Individuals less satisfied with the services that they receive
from government officials or local government employees may be more likely to ignore
moderating norm messages and instead seek out assistance from violent extremist groups.
Similarly, marginalized Malians who see themselves as having less efficacy – that is, lack the
ability to alter their political environment – may not seek to support the existing government,
ignoring it or, ultimately, seeking to undermine it.
This study also includes a number of potential cultural drivers of behavior and attitudes,
including impressions of the northern rebellion, views of the United States, support or opposition
for the implementation of sharia (Islamic religious) law, and support or opposition for the use of
violence in the name of Islam. Those who hold negative views of the U.S., support the
implementation of Islamic religious law in a democratic state, and support violence in the name
of Islam may be less likely to seek out messages of tolerance and peace and similarly less likely
to become civically engaged. By including these characteristics as potential controls, the study
disentangles potentially overlapping or highly correlated perspectives.
The core treatment / control variable (operationalized as a dummy) is whether or not
residents were directly or indirectly exposed to five years of U.S. government programming
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which sought to encourage them to tune into radio programming on peace and tolerance,
mobilize them to participate in community decision making, and view VEO behavior negatively.
U.S. government programs for the Trans-Sahel Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in the
city of Timbuktu were run by a variety of partners over the period 2005-2010.36 Thousands of
Timbuktu‟s residents, exposed to a broad array of messages through educational, governance,
and financial programs, were encouraged to tune into the peace and harmony radio programs run
by local stations in local languages. Educational, norm messaging, and radio programs reached a
broad population in Timbuktu.37 For example, USAID helped provide new radio equipment,
two-way communications radio, and training to multiple Timbuktu community radio stations.
Regionally, teaching training programs broadcast over this network reached 1403 teachers in 217
schools in the area.38 On average, at least 600 students would have benefitted from USAID
sponsored educational programming per year.39
Beyond the Timbuktu residents who directly interacted with United States programming,
past studies have shown how social networks rapidly transmit ideas throughout their members
even in poor, underdeveloped rural areas.40 Given the strong interdependence of ideas within
geographically-defined communities, even weak ties (Granovetter 1973) between individuals in
the network can spread new behaviors and attitudes through social learning and social
influence.41 Research on Malian social networks, for example, confirmed that they influenced
individual decisions about critical health issues such as contraception.42 Members in a
community receive information about ideas and innovation – such as solving conflicts using
mediation, and not violence – from their friends, acquaintances, and family who already engage
in such behavior and promote it through their connections. In short, a large percentage of
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Timbuktu residents were exposed to new norms both directly (through participation in US
government programs) and indirectly (through their social networks).
Dire, in contrast, had little or no such U.S. government-sponsored programming over the
2005-2010 period, but radio tests in the area showed that local radios in Dire could pick up
USAID-supported shows on issues of peace and tolerance from other, nearby locations. More
than half of Malians rely on local radio as their primary source of trusted news and that the
content often revolves around entertainment. Residents of both cities had the capacity, but not
necessarily the motivation, to tune into programming which encouraged peaceful negotiations
and nonviolent communication. Individuals in Timbuktu directly interacted with US government
programming in schools, workshops, and indirectly through their social networks, while Dire
based respondents had neither form of contact.

Data
The study utilizes data collected through a 14-question survey in mid-December 2010 in
the cities of Timbuktu and Dire administered to 200 respondents in local languages by the
Association Malienne pour la Survie au Sahel (Malian Association for the Management of the
Sahel, AMSS).43 The survey questions were structured as Likert-responses with scales from 1
to 5 for each answer, with 5 set as outcomes most favorable to the United States. Respondents
within these cities were chosen at random from the broader population by surveyors visiting the
community on foot; after knocking on doors, they identified themselves as surveyors seeking out
the opinions of local residents and, if admitted, administer the survey. For security reasons and
to avoid possible bias they did not identify themselves as contractors of the United States
government. Figure 1 below provides a map of the two cities under study, which sit side by side
in the northern half of the country.
11

[Figure 1 here]
The cities for the study were chosen deliberately, not randomly, through a paired
comparison approach to data analysis.44 Dire, the administrative center of the Diré Cercle, is a
town and commune on the left bank of the Niger River in the Timbuktu Region of Mali. In 2009
its population was 22,365. Timbuktu, capital of the region of Timbuktu, has a larger population,
closer to 54,000, but shares many of the demographic, civic participation, and gender
characteristics of Dire. Table 1 below provides a comparison between the two cities.

[Table 1 here]
As Table 1 illustrates, both cities have Islam as their core religion and have mostly balanced sex
ratios (that is, roughly equal numbers of women and men). While Dire has a smaller population
than Timbuktu and has had a slighter smaller population growth rate over the past few years, it
has higher rankings on several critical socioeconomic indicators, including voter turnout and
poverty levels. Both also have similar levels of primary and secondary schooling, and both of
these cities sit in an area of Mali with primary school attendance “well below the national
average (between 26 percent and 31 percent)” (Nikolic 2007: 24). Roughly 1/3 of Malians have
received no formal schooling, and only 5 percent have completed university. It is important to
recognize the strong demographic, religious, and socioeconomic similarities between the two
neighbor cities; with such parallel conditions, any differences in cognitive and behavioral
outcomes are more likely the result of policy interventions (in Timbuktu) or natural conditions
(in Dire).
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Table 2 below provides descriptive statistics about the variables captured through the
interviews; notice the regular variation of more than 1 point on the 5-point scale for these
questions.

[Table 2 here]
The population captured through polling includes women and men from early to late adulthood
(no one under 18 was interviewed) and showed diversity in its socioeconomic, political, and
cultural perspectives. By and large respondents believed that the northern rebellion was not
justified (with 1 being justified, and 5 being unjustified, the mean was 4.35), that the Malian
government should work with the West to fight terrorism (a mean of 4.44, with 1 indicating
disagreement and 5 indicating agreement), and some interest in instituting Islamic law (with a
mean of 2.9, and 1 indicating support and 5 indicating a lack of support). There was broad
variation in these answers, with an average standard deviation greater than 1 across the
questions.

Methodology
The first step in analyzing the data uses a bivariate approach to see if there are any
noticeable connections between exposure (and lack thereof) to the U.S. programming and
outcomes of the key variables of interest. Cross tabulation with Chi-squared distribution tests of
the treatment and control groups show a strong connection between exposure and listening to
radio programs about peace and tolerance. Figure 2 below maps out the raw data from the polls
into box-and-whisker graphs, with the line in the center of the box indicating the mean value, the
ends of the whiskers showing the 5th and 95th percentile limits, and the outliers illustrated as
individual points.
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[Figure 2 here]
Notice that the difference between the responses of the two groups has a Chi-squared
(probability value) of .017, meaning that there is a very strong connection between the location
of the respondent in Timbuktu or Dire and his or her listening behaviors. The next outcome of
interest, participation in decision making in the community, is illustrated through Figure 3 below.

[Figure 3 here]

The Chi-squared P value for this relationship is .002, again indicating a strong correlation
between location and civic engagement. In contrast to the clear distinction in answers to
questions about civic engagement and peace and tolerance program listening between Malians
living in Timbuktu and Dire, bivariate tests of the other two outcomes of interest showed no
measurable difference. The Chi-squared value for the answers to the question, “Is the U.S.
fighting Islam or terror?” was .397 (indicating no strong divisions by control or treatment) while
the answers for “Are Al Qaeda‟s activities justified under Islamic law?” had a value of .743
(again indicating little difference between the two groups). (I omit the graphs of these two
outcomes for space considerations.) These initial analyses indicate the presence of a strong
relationship for two of the four outcomes of interest, but these bivariate approaches have not
attempted to control for confounding factors.
The next stage of analysis uses an ordered probit (oprobit) regression to control for
various other factors, such as age, sex, demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural characteristics
in illuminating potential relationships between the control/treatment groups and outcomes of
interest. An ordered probit model is more appropriate here than a standard regression model
because the outcomes of interest are limited, ordinal dependent variables (with a ranking from
14

one to five), while regressions assume continuous structures for outcomes. It is important to
recognize that coefficient outputs of the ordered probit model cannot be interpreted in the same
way as a regression model given the cut-points assumed by the analysis. Here, we focus on the P
value for the treatment/control – should the P value sit at .05 or lower, it indicates a 95 percent
probability that the relationship between this variable and the outcome is not due to randomness.
Table 2 demonstrates the outcomes of the oprobit model using the 16 independent
variables captured by the poll to illustrate their relationship with the outcome of listening to
peace and tolerance radio. Notice that for almost all of the variables, while the coefficients
indicate some effect on the outcome, those coefficients are not statistically significant. The only
independent variable with a statistically significant effect on the outcome of listening to such
radio programs is whether or not respondents were in the control or treatment groups.
[Table 2 here]
Table 3 below shows the relationship between those variables and the outcome of
participating in local decision making processes. Here, several dependent variables show up as
statistically significant, including satisfaction with services, belief that the local councilor will
listen, opinion about the United States, and age. But notice again that the variable of being in
either Timbuktu or Dire has an effect almost as strong or stronger than the other variables, and its
coefficient is statistically significant (with a P value of .034).

[Table 3 here]
For the other two outcomes of interest, however, being in Timbuktu or Dire had no measurable
impact; for justifying Al Qaeda‟s activities under Islam, the P value for treatment/control was
.520 (far above the cut-off of .05) and for the U.S. fighting Islam or terror, it was .298 (again, not
statistically significant).
15

At this point the analysis has demonstrated that even controlling for confounding factors,
being in the treatment or control group has a strong and significant correlation with civic
engagement and listening to peace radio, but not with justifying Al Qaeda‟s behavior under
Islam or on the question of whether the US is fighting terrorism or Islam. It is difficult to make a
causal claim that exposure to U.S. programming leads to increased local participation and radio
listening based solely on regression analysis results, however. To make a stronger claim requires
re-ordering the data through propensity matching techniques to better resemble a twins-study
type structure so that the treatment and control groups are alike in as many ways as possible.
Propensity matching takes an existing dataset and processes it, removing unlike
observations to make the treatment and control groups as balanced and similar as possible.45 In
the same way that medical experiments often use twins who are alike in as many ways as
possible – genetically and environmentally, for example, for twins raised in the same household
– propensity score matching drops observations that are not on common support (that is, sit
within the same range of the propensity score) and seeks to create a smaller and more
comparable dataset. Doing so changes an observational dataset under quasi-experimental
conditions closer to actual experimental conditions, hoping to reduce bias in the observations of
treatment effects. Here, I used nearest-neighbor matching with replacement to create the new
dataset and then measured the average treatment effect (ATE) for the four outcomes of interest.
The average treatment effect here is the difference in the means between the outcomes of
treatment (Timbuktu) and control (Dire) groups.
Figure 4 below displays the new, matched dataset in histogram form along the propensity
score axis, comparing the treated and untreated (i.e. from Timbuktu or Dire) data along with
whether or not the data were similar enough to be comparable (on common support).46 Note that
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the values at the ends of the propensity score spectrum were, by and large, off common support,
and therefore not used to calculate the average treatment effect.

[Figure 4 here]
Table 4 below shows the average treatment effects for the four outcomes of interest (matching
for the other covariates identified previously in the regression analysis) and displays the P value
along with the 95 percent confidence interval around the estimated coefficients.
[Table 4 here]
The first two outcomes of interest have P values for their average treatment effects under the cutoff of .05, indicating that those values are statistically significant (this outcome is also visible in
the 95 percent confidence intervals for these ATEs which rest entirely above zero). We see that
in both cases, Malians in Timbuktu were roughly 40 percent more likely to listen to peace and
radio programming and participate in local government activities than their similar counterparts
in Dire. In contrast, the last two outcomes of interest had P values well above the statistical cutoff – meaning that the results are not statistically significant, and that there were no observable
differences between the two.

Discussion and Next Steps
Bivariate analysis indicated a relationship between the responses of the Malians in two of
the four outcomes of interest based on their exposure to multivectored U.S. programing.
Similarly, ordered probit (oprobit) regressions showed strong differences between the two cities
holding other variables constant for the variables of participation in local decision making and
listening to the peace and tolerance radio programming. Just as with the bivariate analyses, the
regressions found no measurable differences between the two in the “higher level” answers of
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whether the US is fighting Islam or terrorism and whether or not Al Qaeda‟s use of violence was
justified under Islamic law. Finally, propensity score matching analysis indicated that Malians
living in the city of Timbuktu were 40 percent more likely to listen to peace radio and 40 percent
more likely to be civically engaged than their similar counterparts in Dire. The same technique
showed no measurable difference between the two communities in terms of their higher level
perspectives on justification under Islam for Al Qaeda‟s use of violence or whether the U.S. is
fighting Islam or terror.
Geographical proximity and highly similar background conditions between the treatment
and control group help keep constant many unobserved correlates This paired city comparison –
with very similar economic, demographic, and religious conditions in these neighboring
communities – allows us to point toward U.S. programming as the core factor behind these
different outcomes. Further, as Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) have argued, propensity score
matching allows us to make stronger claims about the causal relationships between variables, as
the technique is not based on correlation (which could flow causally in either direction) and
instead simply measures the differences in outcomes between the two, highly similar groups.
Thanks to propensity score matching outcomes, we can be very certain that the targeted
respondents in Timbuktu had measurably different cognitive and attitudinal outcomes on two of
the four outcomes of interest than their counterparts in Dire. Consistent results across three types
of methodological analyses demonstrate that U.S. countering violent extremism programs such
as TSCTP have had measurable, if limited, results.
However, the selection of paired cities was not randomized and there is no direct way to
link individual respondents to the U.S.-sponsored programs which may have influenced their
behaviors and cognitions (as this data was not collected by the survey teams). As mentioned
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previously, this study relies on the large amount of direct exposure to US programs among the
Timbuktu population in combination with indirect exposure through second- and third-level
social influence. Based on these initial results, scholars and policy makers should work to create
stronger evidence about the impact of multi-vectored programming through three improvements.
First, future studies should use a larger number of observations linked directly to program
exposure to ensure that the captured responses are representative of the larger universe of
individuals in country. While 200 respondents provides a robust sample on which to draw,
ongoing polling in Africa by the Department of Defense‟s AFRICOM affiliated contractors
regularly poll 2000 or more residents. USAID, the State Department, and scholars interested in
the effectiveness of U.S. government programming should invest additional resources in such
field studies. Next, the best field studies have used completely randomized studies to better
ensure a lack of bias.47 Due to resource constraints and security concerns, this study used two
contiguous, very similar towns which had very different levels of U.S. government
programming, but future studies could use more stochastic-based heuristics in selecting field
sites.
Finally, rather than relying on a side-by-side comparison alone, future studies should
undertake a longitudinal study of interventions, beginning with baseline measurements in both
the control and treatment communities and moving on to confirm individual-level exposure to
relevant messages. By establishing baseline parameters in the treatment and control
communities, the study could be structured along a “difference-in-difference” framework which
has been quite popular in economic research.
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Conclusions
Given that military solutions are not sufficient to end violent extremism, and that “an
insurgency cannot be eradicated by force alone”,48 it is critical that academics, NGOs, and aid
agencies work to develop “usable knowledge” about soft-side CVE policies. Such knowledge is
both accurate and politically tractable.49 This article has sought to advance our understanding of
the power of multitrack, developmental USAID programming against violent extremism in
Africa. It found strong evidence that the residents of the city of Timbuktu exposed to five years
of U.S. sponsored programs had different cognitive and behavioral outcomes than their similar
neighbors in Dire in two of the four areas of interest. Timbuktu residents were far more likely to
listen to peace and tolerance radio and to take part in civic activities, but showed little difference
terms of their beliefs about the U.S. fighting terror or Islam and Islamic justification for Al
Qaeda‟s activities. These results confirm the results of other field experiments in Africa that
programs such as reconciliation, peace, and tolerance radio may not change higher-level, abstract
beliefs but can alter both norms and behavior.50
Studies in Chad and Niger illustrated that “radio programming stands out as a significant
success story, well accepted – even beloved in many communities –and it has the broadest
reach.”51 Given that community radio “can be a particularly cost-effective medium with a
significant reach,”52 policy makers should invest in ways to get people to tune in more often to
specific types of programming. According to the Media Sustainability Index, Mali, for example,
has more than 250 FM radio stations throughout the country and that much of the programming
currently tends toward lighter, entertainment-based issues.53 Radio programming which
encourages inter-ethnic cooperation and nonviolence – such as that being used in Rwanda post-
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genocide to bridge gaps between Hutus and Tutsis- should become the baseline for future CVE
toolkits in countries around the world.
Given the effectiveness of radio programming, policy makers should consider further
investing in complementary programs which bring expand listening audiences and use norm
messaging techniques to alter behaviors and attitudes. While radio programming itself is
relatively inexpensive – training local residents to work as journalists and producers, setting up
the physical infrastructure, and distributing hand-cranked or solar radios require small scale
investments – the interventions which build up listeners are, by contrast, somewhat expensive.
Distributing micro grants, strengthening educational and NGO infrastructure, and creating new
industries requires extensive knowledge of local social structures, languages, and customs. U.S.
planners should be prepared for long term engagements in communities of interest, and this may
be a challenge for politicians and political appointees in the civil service often responding to
short term electoral pressures.
Some have called Africa‟s current youth bulge the “cheetah generation” in that they are
hungry for knowledge and opportunities while the elder generations – criticized as “hippos” –
move more slowly to embrace change and have less autonomy to deviate from tradition.54 The
cheetahs have embraced social media, and their numbers – 450 million and rising – indicate that
future programs will need to reorient to include them and their methods of information gathering.
In a decade, it may be that NGOs and aid agencies will move from radios to other, internet-based
platforms for norm messaging. As the United States and other developed nations seek to
influence the developing world away from the destructive messages and recruitment attempts of
violent extremist organizations, policy makers should ensure that their solutions are grounded in
local languages, cultures, and institutions. USAID‟s work in Mali and the Sahel may show that
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this is the first step towards winning hearts and minds in the attempt to counter violent
extremism.
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Figure 1: Map of Paired Cities in Mali, Africa

Note: Figure produced by Jeremy Chevrier.
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Table 1: Comparison of Timbuktu and Dire

City Name

Population
Population
growth Rate
(2009)
(1998-2009)

Voter Turnout
Some primary
for Local
schooling
Elections,
(2009,
2009
percentage)
(percentage)

Some secondary
/ high school
(2009,
percentage)

Able to meet basic
Female
needs with some
(2011,
non-essential goods
percentage)
(2009, percentage)

Islamic
(2009,
percentage)

Ti mbuktu

54453

5.7

48.74

21.3

8.5

48

72.3

100

Di re

22365

4.7

56.14

27.3

9.1

50

81.8

100

Note: Population and growth rate data from Resultats Provisoires RGPH, République de Mali, Institut National de la
Statistique 2009; voter turnout from Ministere de L'Administration Republique du Mali Territoriale et des
Collectivites Locales 2009; additional demographic data from ORB surveys (personal communication, Cara Carter,
April 2012).
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Free to join political organizations

200

4.62

0.71

2.00

5.00

Satisfaction with services

200

3.37

0.96

1.00

5.00

Participation in decision making

199

3.28

1.32

1.00

5.00

Contact with representatives

200

2.76

1.65

1.00

5.00

Likelihood of Councilor listening

200

3.37

1.02

1.00

5.00

Efficacy

200

4.11

1.00

1.00

5.00

Is the rebellion justified

200

4.35

1.27

1.00

5.00

Listen to tolerance and peace radio programs

200

3.98

1.07

1.00

5.00

Opinion on the US

200

3.91

0.96

1.00

5.00

Should Mali work with West to fight terrorism

200

4.44

1.20

1.00

5.00

Is violence in name of Islam justified

200

4.44

1.11

1.00

5.00

Are Al Qaeda's activities justified

200

4.44

1.13

1.00

5.00

Support implementing Sharia

200

2.91

1.86

1.00

5.00

Is the US fighting terror or Islam

200

4.66

0.88

1.00

5.00

Gender

200

0.66

0.48

0.00

1.00

Ethnicity

200

0.80

0.40

0.00

1.00

Age Group

200

3.29

1.48

1.00

5.00

Treatment / Control dummy

200

0.50

0.50

0.00

1.00
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Figure 2

Dire

Timbuktu

1
2
3
4
5
How often do you listen to radio programs about peace and tolerance?
N = 200, Chi squared value = .017
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Figure 3

Dire

Timbuktu

1
2
3
4
5
How often do you participate in decision making in your community?
N = 200, Chi squared = .002
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Table 2:
Ordered Probit Regression: Dependent
Variable of Listening to Peace and
Tolerance Radio

Robust
Coefficient Std.
Err.

z

P>z

Low CI

High
CI

Free to join political organizations
Satisfaction with services
Participation in decision making
Contact with representatives
Likelihood of Councilor listening
Efficacy
Is the rebellion justified or not
Opinion on the US
Should Mali work with West to fight
terrorism?
Is violence in name of Islam justified?
Are Al Qaeda's activities justified?
Support implementing Sharia
Is the US fighting terror or Islam?
Gender
Age Group
Treatment / Control dummy

0.057
0.064
0.085
-0.017
0.009
-0.122
0.031
0.121

0.113
0.112
0.079
0.053
0.085
0.090
0.068
0.092

0.500
0.570
1.060
-0.320
0.100
-1.360
0.470
1.300

0.615
0.568
0.288
0.746
0.919
0.173
0.642
0.192

-0.165
-0.155
-0.071
-0.120
-0.158
-0.299
-0.101
-0.061

0.278
0.282
0.240
0.086
0.176
0.054
0.164
0.302

-0.052

0.070

-0.740 0.456

-0.189

0.085

-0.006
-0.037
-0.002
0.034
-0.255
-0.024
0.448

0.087
0.069
0.053
0.088
0.181
0.058
0.167

-0.060
-0.530
-0.030
0.390
-1.410
-0.410
2.690

-0.176
-0.173
-0.105
-0.137
-0.610
-0.137
0.121

0.165
0.099
0.102
0.206
0.100
0.090
0.775

/cut1

-1.172

0.945

/cut2

-0.921

0.941

/cut3

-0.094

0.938

/cut4

0.897

0.937
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0.948
0.595
0.973
0.694
0.159
0.685
0.007
3.024
2.766
1.932
0.938

0.681
0.924
1.744
2.733

Table 3:
Ordered Probit Regression: Dependent
Variable of Participation in Local Decision
Making
Free to join political organizations
Satisfaction with services
Contact with representatives
Likelihood of Councilor listening
Efficacy
Is the rebellion justified or not
Opinion on the US
Should Mali work with West to fight
terrorism?
Is violence in name of Islam justified?
Are Al Qaeda's activities justified?
Support implementing Sharia
Is the US fighting terror or Islam?
Gender
Age (grouped)
Control
/cut1
/cut2
/cut3
/cut4

Coefficient

Robust
Std.
Err.

0.042
0.523
0.106
0.202
-0.034
-0.063
0.290

P>z

0.110
0.118
0.055
0.082
0.097
0.075
0.104

0.380
4.420
1.930
2.460
-0.350
-0.830
2.790

0.701
0.000
0.053
0.014
0.729
0.404
0.005

-0.173
0.291
-0.002
0.041
-0.223
-0.210
0.087

0.257
0.755
0.214
0.362
0.156
0.085
0.494

-0.081

0.086

-0.930 0.350

-0.249

0.088

0.084
0.017
-0.002
-0.249
-0.104
0.180
0.371
1.937
2.594
3.242
4.488

0.095
0.061
0.048
0.110
0.168
0.060
0.172
0.988
0.991
0.997
1.016

0.890
0.270
-0.040
-2.260
-0.620
3.000
2.160

-0.101
-0.103
-0.097
-0.465
-0.434
0.062
0.034
3.873
4.537
5.196
6.479

0.269
0.137
0.092
-0.033
0.226
0.297
0.708
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0.373
0.785
0.967
0.024
0.537
0.003
0.031
0.001
0.651
1.287
2.496

Low CI

High
CI

z

Figure 4: Example of Evaluation of Balance for Matching

0

.2

.4
Propensity Score

Untreated: Off support
Treated: On support

.6

.8

Untreated: On support
Treated: Off support
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Table 4: Matching Outcomes for Four Quantities of Interest
Variable of Interest (ATE)
Listen to peace and tolerance
Participate in decision making
U.S. fighting terrorism or
Islam
AQ justified under Islam

Average
Treatment
Effect

Standard
Error

z

[95%
Conf.

P>z

Interval]

0.43
0.40

0.19
0.18

2.25
2.25

0.02
0.03

0.06
0.05

0.80
0.76

-0.02

0.13

-0.15

0.88

-0.28

0.24

-0.12

0.18

-0.63

0.53

-0.48

0.24
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